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metaphor—the figure of politics as a stage—in political debates among German Expressionists and Italian 
Futurists before World War I. As the essay argues, this trope was used to critique liberalism's limited 
notion of popular rule and envision how disenfranchised masses might develop the political subjectivity 
needed to create a truly mass democracy. While the essay demonstrates that Futurists and 
Expressionists failed to develop a clear vision of what form mass democracy might take, it concludes that 
they agreed on one point. It would have to entail a qualitative transformation of the democratic ideal of 
popular sovereignty, rather than a quantitative extension of voting rights. This conclusion throws new light 
on the political character of cultural modernism before 1914. Whereas recent research has focused on 
proto-fascist tendencies in modernist ideology, this analysis shows that Expressionism and Futurism 
initially shared a commitment to the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty that was incommensurable 
with fascist methods of orchestrating popular consent for authoritarian rule. 
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Liberalism and the Deferral of Democracy 
When one socialist regime after another toppled in the wake 
of 1989, history seemed to affirm Francis Fukuyama's recently for- 
warded thesis about its immanent demise. As Fukuyama observed 
in "The End of History," a century that began with liberalism in 
retreat had come full circle. Liberal democracy was again the order 
of the day, after surviving challenges from the right and left. What 
Fukuyama's triumphalism underestimated was the difficulty liber- 
alism had in making the halting transition from limited popular 
rule to mass suffrage in the twentieth century. By the time liberal 
regimes began implementing universal suffrage after World War I, 
bolshevism and fascism had already introduced alternative models 
of mass participation. The perception that liberalism had failed to 
redeem its promise of emancipation as its parliamentary institu- 
tions spread across Europe in the nineteenth century helps explain 
the antagonism of avant-gardes in Germany and Italy for liberal 
ideals at the beginning of the twentieth. Indeed, a comparison of 
debates among German Expressionists and Italian Futurists before 
1914 indicates that both groups viewed parliament as a relic of the 
nineteenth century that was destined to be washed away by a tidal 
wave of mass democracy. While this belief proved to be erroneous, 
their critique of parliamentary politics was prescient in anticipating 
the Achilles' heel in Fukuyama's apology for the finality of the liberal 
democratic model at century's end. 1
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The failures of constitutional regimes in Germany and Italy 
to respond to rising demands for political rights at the turn of the 
twentieth century led to a politicization of modernism in these 
lands that was unique for Europe before 1914. While Expressionist 
and Futurist art often looked derivative of innovations emanating 
from Paris, none of the French revolutions in art, from Impression- 
ism to Cubism, ever made claims to be vehicles of social revolu- 
tion in the way that Expressionism and Futurism most emphatically 
did. And notwithstanding the fact that Expressionists and Futurists 
saw themselves constituting a cultural rather than political avant- 
garde, both groups were inspired by utopian visions of a mass so- 
ciety. Surprisingly, political debates documented in Expressionist 
and Futurist periodicals are informed by a single, shared metaphor, 
which compared the field of politics to a stage. This figure pres- 
ents a contrast to socialist debates, which were preoccupied with 
the revisionism of the Second International. The preferred socialist 
metaphor compared the political field to a battlefield and dealt in 
imagery related to military strategy, as in 'war of position' vs. 'war 
of attrition.' It may seem odd that the cultural avant-garde, which 
borrowed its founding metaphor-that of an advance guard-from 
the martial imaginary of revolutionary politics, would abandon this 
imagery when it turned to politics. But Expressionists and Futurists 
preferred an image defined by the distinctions between actor and 
spectator, comedy and tragedy. The following analysis suggests that 
this trope played a key role in modernism's critique of liberalism's 
limited notion of popular rule. 
"The proletarian masses, in particular, presented psychologists 
with a problem hardly encountered before in world history," Samuel 
Lublinski wrote in Die Bilanz der Moderne (The Balance of Modern- 
ism) in 1904. The rise of socialism in the late nineteenth century 
marked "the first time the 'people' had evolved into a conscious and 
clear-headed political player," he claimed (40). As Lublinksi noted, 
politics had been the playground of princes for most of history. Only 
now were the masses beginning to develop political subjectivity, he 
argued. At the time, Lublinski was collaborating on a radical review, 
Kampf (Struggle), edited by Senna Hoy (born Johannes Holzmann) 
in Berlin. This publishing experiment ended when Hoy left for the 
Russian Revolution in 1905, but its example provided a model for 2




the radical cultural currents that later coalesced in Expressionism. 
The editors of the most influential Expressionist reviews, Herwarth 
Walden (born Georg Levin) and Franz Pfemfert, both worked with 
Hoy, and the titles of their periodicals, Der Sturm (The Tempest), 
founded by Walden in 1910, and Die Aktion (The Campaign), found- 
ed by Pfemfert in 1911, suggest that each saw himself as the legiti- 
mate heir to Hoy's radical legacy. These weeklies, which mimicked 
daily newspapers, represented innovative attempts to circumvent 
the established media of academic art and party politics and create 
a new audience for radical ideas (McClintick). They exemplify the 
"remarkable rapprochement between avant-garde aesthetic, radical 
politics, and popular culture" that characterized radical modernism 
before the First World War (Perloff xvii). 
The first of these Expressionist weeklies, Der Sturm, was mod- 
eled after an Italian weekly Walden knew through contacts in Flor- 
ence. Giuseppe Prezzolini started La Voce (The Voice) as a forum 
where the heretics from established parties and churches (including 
the 'modernists' recently excommunicated by Pius X) could debate 
"social questions posed by the new forms of human coexistence cre- 
ated by the new industrial world" ("Al lettore"). Overnight, La Voce 
became the most influential forum for dissent in Italy (Gentile, La 
Voce 213). Its unique status as arbiter of avant-garde discourse is 
evidenced by the fact that its initial resistance to Futurism hindered 
the movement's acceptance in Italy after publication of F.T. Mari- 
netti's manifesto in Le Figaro in February 1909 won international 
notoriety. This resistance was finally broken when Prezzolini's clos- 
est collaborator, Giovanni Papini, left La Voce to found the most 
successful of all Futurist reviews, Lacerba (The Bitter Pill), in Janu- 
ary 1913. This event marked the breakthrough for Futurism in Italy, 
as a young Antonio Gramsci noted in a contribution to a student 
newspaper in Turin ("The Futurists"). Futurism had already found 
an ally in Der Sturm, however. For one year, beginning in March 
1912, Walden turned Der Sturm into the most important forum for 
Futurism in Europe, promoting exhibits of Futurist art and pub- 
lishing manifestos in translation (Demetz). This brief alliance left 
no trace in the political discussions of Expressionists or Futurists, 
however. If, as the following analysis suggests, both groups arrived 
at similar conclusions, then this was less the result of productive 3
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cross-fertilization than of independently developed diagnoses of a 
problem they shared in common: the inability of their parliamen- 
tary regimes to accommodate mass participation. 
Politics as Public Performance 
From the publication of its first issue, Prezzolini's Voce left 
no doubt about its sympathy for the extra-parliamentary politics 
of revolutionary syndicalism theorized by Georges Sorel. As Eric 
Hobsbawm observed, revolutionary syndicalism became the poli- 
tics of choice for an entire generation of dissident intellectuals an- 
gered by the gradualist accommodation of Socialist parties in the 
decade before 1914 (134). When the Florentine weekly printed an 
article titled "Il valore morale del sindacalismo" ("The Moral Value 
of Syndicalism") in its third issue, Prezzolini felt compelled to add 
a disclaimer denying allegations his publication was a syndicalist 
mouthpiece. The author of the article was Paolo Mazzoldi, secretary 
of the Parma Chamber of Labor. Under Mazzoldi's direction, the 
Parma Chamber had organized a general strike in the summer of 
1908 that kept 33,000 workers inactive for two months. The strike 
was only ended when army troops occupied the Chamber's offices 
and confiscated its strike funds. The Socialist Party reacted by ex- 
pelling syndicalists from its ranks when it met in Florence in Sep- 
tember 1908. When La Voce began publishing three months later, it 
printed Mazzoldi's piece to protest the party censure. 
Mazzoldi began by criticizing the revisionist program of the 
Second International and the reformist policies of the Italian So- 
cialist Party, before turning to revolutionary syndicalism. His argu- 
ments hinged on a standard Sorelian trope, namely, the idea that the 
general strike, the basic tool of revolutionary syndicalism, is not di- 
rected toward any goal but the direct expression of the workers' will 
through the spontaneous and collective refusal to work. In a series of 
articles first published in 1905-1906 in the Italian journal Il divenire 
sociale (Social Transformation) and then collected and reprinted in 
1908 in France as Reflexions sur la violence (Reflections on Violence), 
Sorel insisted that the general strike must remain purely destructive 
in its intention. Only if the terrifying idea of catastrophic and ir- 
revocable overthrow is maintained as a horizon of expectation can 4




the general strike reveal its moral character. "But, in undertaking a 
serious, formidable, and sublime work, the socialists [i.e., revolu- 
tionary syndicalists] raise themselves above our frivolous society and 
make themselves worthy of pointing out new roads to the world," he 
argued (281). In other words, syndicalist methods of direct action 
were intended to transform the agents as much as the social order 
they attacked. Mazzoldi's arguments echoed Sorel's ideas. "Even if 
the syndicalist doctrine were nothing more than the error of a few 
utopians," he wrote, "the single act of placing workers before their 
own future, of exalting their power, of awaiting the new philosophy 
from their muscles, would be enough to elevate the moral worth 
of the working classes." According to Mazzoldi, striking offered a 
medium for the disenfranchised masses to practice and thereby de- 
velop political subjectivity. By focusing on the performative aspect 
of political subjectivity, Mazzoldi introduced the conceptual frame- 
work that informs the metaphor of politics as a stage. 
There was at least one good reason why the extra-parliamentary 
methods of syndicalism found such resonance among Italians at the 
turn of the twentieth century: the fact that so many were excluded 
from participating in the parliamentary regime. The constitution 
that unified Italy inherited from Piedmont in 1861 was a document 
of liberal government for the people. It did not foresee government 
by the people, at least not if 'people' is intended as a synonym for 
`masses.' In the first post-unification election of 1861, less than two 
percent of the population was eligible to vote (Cammarano 8). Apart 
from one reform that increased the electorate to seven percent in 
1882, no further reform was attempted until Giovanni Gentile, the 
perennial prime minister of the prewar decade, proposed 'univer- 
sal' (male) suffrage in June 1912, bringing the electorate up to 24 
percent (Gentile, Le origini 231). In the years leading to this belated 
reform, the political writer for La Voce, Gaetano Salvemini, waged 
an impassioned campaign for universal suffrage from the pages of 
the journal and floor of Socialist Party congresses. "We can see but 
one means of salvation," he wrote after elections in March 1909, 
"the eruption of the illiterate masses in public life." Only then could 
the cycle of corruption and cooptation that dictated parliamentary 
politics be broken, Salvemini argued ("Commento"). 
In contrast to Italy, Germany became the first European state to 5
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introduce universal male suffrage when Bismarck extended the gen- 
erous voting rights of the North German Federation to the entire 
Kaiserreich upon its founding in 1871. But democratic appearances 
were deceiving. A system of parliamentary checks insured that cos- 
metic concessions to democratic sentiment did not hinder the gov- 
ernment in managing affairs of state. The major concession, uni- 
versal suffrage for males 25 years and older in Reichstag elections, 
was checked by that house's subordination to the Bundesrat, a less 
democratic body of state delegations that was dominated by Prus- 
sia. The institutionalization of Prussian hegemony in the Bundesrat 
was not itself undemocratic, since two-thirds of all Germans lived 
in Prussia. But the Prussian Landtag, whose delegation exercised de 
facto control of the Bundesrat, was elected by an extremely undem- 
ocratic procedure. When Bismarck established the direct and equal 
male franchise for Reichstag elections, he mitigated its effect by re- 
taining an older law for the Prussian Landtag. This law provided 
for the non-secret, indirect election of delegates in three unequal 
classes based on taxes paid. The top two brackets, which represented 
15 percent of voters, elected two-thirds of all delegates, while the 85 
percent of the electorate that fell into the lowest bracket elected but 
a third. In addition, the ten percent of otherwise eligible voters who 
fell below the minimum tax threshold were barred from voting in 
elections to the Prussian Landtag (Berghahn 210-11). This arrange- 
ment kept the reigns of power in Europe's most modern, industrial 
state firmly in the hands of a shrinking class of landed gentry (the 
East Prussian Junker) until 1918. At the same time, Bismarck's cos- 
metic concessions to democratic ideals had the unintended effect of 
inducing real desires for popular participation (Ullmann 33). 
When Der Sturm began publishing in March 1910, the deferral 
of democracy in Prussia had led to political crisis and social unrest. 
Social Democrats had been staging demonstrations when a govern- 
ment headed by Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg proposed minor 
modifications to the three-class voting system in early 1910. Out- 
rage at the half-hearted reform culminated in an SPD-led demon- 
stration of 250,000 in Berlin on March 6 (Mommsen 377). In the 
third issue of Der Sturm, poet Ferdinand Hardekopf addressed the 
protests in a piece titled "Ein Neugieriger" ("A Curious Bystander"). 
Hardekopf, writing under a pseudonym, compared his fascination 6




for the spectacle of the mobilized masses to Baudelaire's attraction 
to the "theater" staged by crowds in Paris in 1848. "Of course, it is a 
ridiculous illusion to expect anything of Prussian voting rights, of 
any parliamentary politics, no matter how democratic," he observed. 
"And yet the popular masses now demonstrating in the streets of 
Prussian cities believe in a political ideal [...1. And who knows? Per- 
haps these lower-class citizens become beautiful by taking to the 
streets for this idea" (Hardekopf's emphasis). It would be easy to 
dismiss these comments as the patronizing opinions of a literary 
aesthete. Indeed, his description of protesters as "beautiful" seems 
to deny the political character of their actions. But Hardekopf was 
a hard-nosed political thinker who criticized Expressionist friends 
for being politically naive (Barnouw, Sheppard). In this statement 
he was less concerned with aesthetics than with the psychic function 
of the demonstrations, which he claimed had given disenfranchised 
citizens an opportunity to exercise political subjectivity. In saying 
the performance had made them "beautiful," he suggested that it 
had ennobled them. He argued that the aim of the protesters had 
not been voting rights per se but rather "human dignity." 
In The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Hegel developed the 
concept of recognition to describe the psychic dimension of politi- 
cal subjectivity highlighted by Hardekopf and Mazzoldi in their ref- 
erences to the metaphor of politics as stage. According to Hegel, the 
conflict-laden dynamic of social relations is driven by the desire of 
every individual to have his or her dignity as a free subject acknowl- 
edged by others. In his book-length sequel to "The End of History?" 
Fukuyama explicitly referred to Hegel's concept of recognition to 
support his claim that liberal democracy represents the final stage 
in humanity's ideological evolution and thus the end of history. 
Only liberal democracy provides recognition "on a universal basis 
in which the dignity of each person as a free and autonomous be- 
ing is recognized by all," Fukuyama argued in The End of History 
and the Last Man (200). This is the idea Expressionists and Futurists 
contested with the stage metaphor. If, as Hegel suggested, recogni- 
tion can only be won through agonistic struggle, then the liberal- 
democratic institution of parliament, where the masses of citizens 
are represented by a few deputies, does not offer most citizens any 
forum to seek or win recognition. Hardekopf's dismissal of electoral 7
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politics for reducing political participation to the casting of ballots 
suggests that the representational forms of liberal democracy will 
never give life the same sense of drama as a direct and potentially 
violent demonstration of public protest. 
When Die Aktion began publishing a year after Hardekopf's 
statement, the government's modest attempt at electoral reform 
had already ended in a fiasco (Hertz-Eichenrode 180). The new re- 
view responded by rejecting electoral politics as empty theater and 
promoting syndicalist ideas on direct action, instead. When English 
workers staged a general strike in the summer of 1911, for example, 
Editor Franz Pfemfert heralded the event as a "storm signal of the 
final and decisive, social revolution" ("Sturmsignale" 834). The gen- 
eral strike is not about wage increases or other material concessions, 
Pfemfert told readers. "It is a dress rehearsal for the last great war 
of emancipation" (833). In this allusion to the stage trope, Pfem- 
fert highlighted an important syndicalist tenet: namely, the idea that 
striking, in particular, and political action, in general, represents a 
performative end in itself, apart from any material goals that might 
have motivated its inception. Like Mazzoldi, Pfemfert believed that 
the performative quality of striking served an important function 
by giving disenfranchised masses an opportunity to practice politi- 
cal subjectivity. Like Mazzoldi, he insisted that the strategic consid- 
erations of union organizers be subordinated to the spontaneous 
self-expression of workers. Only then could the masses develop the 
kind of political agency described by Lublinski in The Balance of 
Modernism. 
Comedy, the Opiate of the People 
When the Reichstag recessed in October 1911 with elections 
scheduled for January 1912, Pfemfert called on readers to ignore the 
campaign, boycott the balloting, and engage in extra-parliamen- 
tary action, instead. "We have gotten so comfortably used to view- 
ing the Reichstag as an entertainment establishment that we treat 
its recesses like the vacation of any other theater;' Pfemfert wrote 
in an editorial titled "Das politische Schauspielhaus" ("The Politi- 
cal Playhouse"). If earlier examples of the stage metaphor had the- 
matized the performative quality of political subjectivity, Pfemfert 8




now emphasized the fictional quality of representative democracy: 
namely, the idea that one parliamentarian can 'stand in' for a body 
of constituents that is in fact absent. Pfemfert's comments indi- 
cate that the pseudo-participatory quality of German institutions 
had discredited the idea of representative democracy. The average 
German had "become accustomed to viewing his parliament as a 
powerless institution, as a mask to hide absolutism," he argued in 
"The Political Playhouse" (1121). In a subsequent piece Pfemfert re- 
turned to the fictional quality of parliamentary representation and 
called the Reichstag an "Imperial Comic Opera:' "Will the German 
citizen never recognize that this parliamentarianism from which he 
awaits salvation does not represent genuine democratic power, but 
rather an opiate for every stirring of freedom, for every democratic 
desire?" Pfemfert asked rhetorically. "And yet the people 'struggle' 
for this charade in Prussia" ("Hungernde Volksschullehrer" 1345). 
In caricaturing parliamentary politics as a "charade," Pfemfert em- 
ployed the stage metaphor to disarticulate the democratic ideal of 
popular sovereignty from its identification with the liberal institu- 
tion of parliament. 
In Italy, La Voce had also worked to separate the democratic ide- 
al of popular sovereignty from identification with the compromised 
institutions of liberalism. In the electoral commentary cited earli- 
er, the staff of La Voce said they rejected all party labels but would 
have been happy to call themselves "democrats" if the name had 
not been "usurped" by the parties coinvolved in an undemocratic 
system of parliamentary cooptation. When Giolitti temporarily left 
government in December 1909, Prezzolini contrasted the perennial 
prime minister's skill at parliamentary deal-making with the ideal 
of popular sovereignty, arguing in "Da Giolitti a Sonnino" ("From 
Giolitti to Sonnino") that parliament actually ruled against the will 
of the people. "Giolitti's government was parliamentary and not na- 
tional, which is to say, it was surrounded by the loyal support of a 
clientele in parliament and broad antipathy in the provinces" (225, 
Prezzolini's emphases). In a piece titled "Il problema della democra- 
zia" ("The Problem of Democracy"), Antonio Anzilotti argued that 
the gap between parliament and the people had discredited the very 
idea of participatory democracy. "In reality, the principle of democ- 
racy, that it corresponds to the total sum of individual wills, has 9
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become totally bankrupt. The people have not put their hands to 
work in shaping the organs of state, and the state has only exercised 
the illusion of sovereignty" (679). In criticizing what he considered 
to be a betrayal of democratic principles, Anzilotti asked whether a 
regime that claims to be democratic and yet permits its citizens to 
remain spectators does not forfeit its legitimacy. 
Two years after Pfemfert began calling for Germans to boycott 
electoral politics, Italians were preparing for their first elections 
since parliament had approved Giolitti's bill introducing universal 
male suffrage. One of the dreams that inspired La Voce was finally 
becoming reality: Italy was making the transition to a modern, mass 
democracy. Hence, it might seem strange that Giovanni Papini, a 
vociano of the first hour, would echo Pfemfert's call for a boycott 
and tell voters, including those who had never before had the op- 
portunity to vote, to stay home. But that is precisely what he did in a 
piece titled "Freghiamoci della politica" ("Let's Give a Damn About 
Politics"), published in Lacerba in October 1913. F.T. Marinetti, the 
founder and impresario of Futurism, responded with a hastily com- 
posed manifesto of Futurist politics, in which he appealed to Futur- 
ists to cast their ballots for a disparate agenda that ranged from "the 
economic defense and patriotic education of the proletariat" to a 
"cynical, astute, and aggressive foreign policy" ("Programma" 221). 
Papini published Marinetti's manifesto on the front page of the sub- 
sequent issue, but he also added a disclaimer in which he defended 
his call for an electoral boycott and criticized Marinetti for being 
politically naive ("Postilla"). 
In "Let's Give a Damn About Politics," Papini called on "intel- 
ligent" Italians to withhold support for a regime that staged comic 
entertainment in parliament to divert attention from the real exer- 
cise of power elsewhere, "behind the scenes." Here Papini echoed 
Pfemfert's use of the stage metaphor to critique the fictional qual- 
ity of parliamentary representation. "Real political power is located 
outside the parties. They try as best they can to represent and ex- 
ploit this power, but all they manage to do is hide it," he concluded. 
"Real politics, the politics of deeds and not debates, is the work of 
Capitalists, Priests, and Workers. The rest is only comedy played out 
in more or less good faith" ("Freghiamoci" 213). The figures Papini 
identified as "real" political actors were representatives of collective 10




identities who did not hesitate to use violence when the prestige 
of their group was at stake. This violence might take the form of 
striking (in the case of workers), factory lock-outs (in the case of 
industrialists), or forbidding Catholics to vote (as the Vatican did 
when Italy annexed Rome). In contrast to deputies in parliament, 
who seemed all too susceptible to cooptation, the representatives of 
these groups were willing to accept sacrifice and inflict pain on op- 
ponents in order to win recognition for their groups. 
Papini understood that Giolitti had extended voting rights as a 
ploy to remain in power. For a decade anticipating this move, Giolitti 
had retained power by means of what came to be known as a parlia- 
mentary dictatorship. This term referred to his ability to assemble 
ad hoc majorities united by no agenda other than allegiance to him 
and his pork-barrel politics. During this decade, in which giolittismo 
became a synonym for trasformismo (the generic term for `coopta- 
tion'), Giolitti's ability to build patchwork majorities spanning the 
political spectrum had made ideological differences irrelevant. Pap- 
ini correctly predicted that Giolitti would retain power regardless of 
whether millions of new voters pushed the political pendulum to 
the right or left. Giolitti would always win, Papini argued, because 
he knew how to play whichever role the "parliamentary comedy" 
demanded at a given moment. Giolitti could "play the socialist and 
the imperialist, all the while laughing under his breath at the theo- 
retical calculations of those who fall for the performance on stage 
and never understand that in politics the real dramatic action takes 
place behind the scenes" ("Freghiamoci" 214). Papini suggested that 
the gap between the fiction on-stage and the actual exercise of pow- 
er backstage had neutralized public debate and trivialized politi- 
cal life. As his commentary suggests, the problem of neutralization 
raised the challenge of creating a political culture that can provide 
a forum for the public representation of social differences and offer 
each party involved a meaningful opportunity to seek recognition. 
Faced with the tragicomic impotence of the Reichstag, one of 
Germany's most prominent liberals, Max Weber, abandoned the 
ideal of parliament as a forum for interpreting the popular will. 
Weber argued instead that modern parliaments are nothing more 
than instruments used to orchestrate popular support for deci- 
sions made by a technocratic apparatus. "Today, parliaments are the 11
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means for making this minimum of consent superficially manifest," 
he wrote in 1917 (339). Despite the reference to fictional perfor- 
mance, Weber's study, which considered, how a postwar Germany 
might be reorganized as a mass democracy, drew on a different fig- 
ure, the metaphor of politics as business. "When seen from a so- 
ciological perspective, the modern state is as much a 'business' as 
any factory," Weber argued (321). If the state is compared to a fac- 
tory, then nothing threatens it more than the striking advocated by 
Expressionists and Futurists before 1914. Indeed, Weber criticized 
the avant-garde's "ethic of heroic fraternity" for undermining sup- 
port for parliamentary rule (309, 366). He concluded by predicting 
that any mass democracy would reduce political discourse to dema- 
goguery and force a caesarist solution in which the masses elect a 
charismatic leader to exercise semi-dictatorial power. If the liberal 
institution of parliament was incommensurable with the romantic 
ideal of popular sovereignty, as Weber argued, then Expressionists 
and Futurists, unlike Weber, were prepared to sacrifice parliament 
to salvage popular sovereignty. 
From Political Comedy to Tragedy 
As a sincere liberal, Giolitti, like Weber, understood that fail- 
ure to integrate the masses in public life posed a threat to the state. 
Indeed, Giolitti had taken office with intentions of making politics 
more inclusive. But once he became occupied with assembling par- 
liamentary majorities, he reverted instead to a strategy of depoliti- 
cizing the masses through economic concessions. By the time he 
finally extended voting rights, nearly a decade after taking office, 
his holding pattern had created a reservoir of popular resentment 
ready to explode in violence. This is exactly what happened in the 
summer of 1914. When revolutionary syndicalists staged a nation- 
wide general strike in June 1914, Papini observed that political life 
was momentarily elevated from comedy to tragedy. The drama 
began when the Independent Syndicalist Union (USI) called anti- 
militarist demonstrations for June 7. In the Adriatic port of Ancona, 
police shot into a crowd of protesters, killing two persons on the 
spot and mortally wounding a third. To protest the repressive use of 
force by the government, the Socialist Party and rail-workers union 12




joined the USI in calling for a general strike, which effectively shut 
down the national economy. The red flag was hoisted over public 
buildings in many municipalities throughout Italy, and the strike 
turned into armed rebellion in the Romagna, which had a long tra- 
dition of rural anarchism. In the end it took army troops a week to 
restore order. Gramsci would later describe the settimana rossa, or 
Red Week, as "the first, glorious intervention of the popular masses 
on the political stage." For the first time, the masses exercised "the 
popular sovereignty that no longer found any expression at all in 
the representative Chamber," Gramsci argued ("Il popolo" 9-10). In 
these comments, Gramsci drew on Papini's analysis, which he re- 
peatedly cited in his Prison Notebooks. 
Papini began his comments, titled "I fatti di giugno" ("The 
Events of June"), by arguing that parliament's claim to constitute 
a marketplace of ideas, in which rational debate determines pub- 
lic policy by consensus, diverts attention from the struggle among 
competing interests that is deciding policy backstage. "The REAL 
political life of the country consists in this Marketplace of Interests, 
where each individual or party tries to get the better of his rival," he 
wrote (Papini's emphases). "The rest is just slogans, big words and 
hot air balloons, personal aggrandizement, partisan rivalries, corri- 
dor conspiracies, and drum shots for the folks in the gallery" (181). 
In his previous call for an electoral boycott, Papini had focused on 
the actors. Now he turned to those who had been relegated to the 
passive role of spectators. "Sooner or later, however, the folks in the 
gallery catch on to the comedy and find it too costly, because they 
have to buy a new ticket for each act," he wrote. "The folks in the 
gallery, who are for the most part ignorant innocents kept clueless 
by the newspaper accomplices of the various theatrical companies, 
applaud or boo the actors, but they would like something better. 
So every now and then they riot and let blood. And for a moment, 
tragedy interrupts the comedy" ("Fatti di giugno" 181). 
Here Papini pulled together both strands of the stage metaphor 
discussed so far. First, he presented a powerful image of the distinc- 
tion between actor and spectator, which is essential to any demo- 
cratic notion of political agency. As his image clearly suggests, this 
distinction consists in the difference between being on stage and 
being in the audience. Secondly, he identified what was at stake in 13
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the comedy trope first elaborated by Pfemfert in Die Aktion. The 
critique implicit in this metaphor suggests that the comic effect of 
parliamentary cooptation trivializes public life by neutralizing so- 
cial differences. As Pfemfert's modification of the Mandan analogy 
to opium indicates, parliamentary comedy had the effect of deaden- 
ing democratic desires and keeping the masses docile. Indeed, the 
resolution of comedy in conciliatory laughter offers an insight into 
liberal democracy's quest for social consensus, which can only be 
had at the cost of suppressing difference. Parliament's tendency to 
suppress conflict and present a steady program of comedy had cre- 
ated a dangerous reservoir of resentment, Papini suggested. If par- 
liamentary debate had devolved into comedy, then a higher form 
of theater was needed, one that could elevate political life to drama 
and provide a forum for its public manifestation. This is what the 
masses achieved when their latent resentment erupted into manifest 
violence, he argued. For one week in June, the political stage was 
transposed from parliament to streets, squares, and factory floors. 
For a week, the roles of actor and spectator were reversed, as the 
masses took the stage and became actors. 
As Papini indicated, the counterpoint to comedy-tragedy-is 
defined by the existential distinction between life and death. The 
psychological appeal of comedy resides in its ability to present reas- 
suring images of social reconciliation. According to Hegel's defini- 
tion in Lectures on Aesthetics, comedy can only end with the rec- 
onciliation of a protagonist who has challenged the ethical order 
because his or her challenge represents an expression of arbitrary 
individuality that lacks ethical substance. Once the protagonist has 
been shown that the principle s/he represents (such as greed) is ar- 
bitrary, then nothing prevents him or her from renouncing the vice 
and being welcomed back into the ethical order. Indeed, this recon- 
ciliation reaffirms the legitimacy of the existing order. Paradoxically, 
it is the tragic hero, the one who puts his or her life on the line for an 
ethical principle and refuses to back down, who must die, if a more 
just order is to emerge. In Sophocles's Antigone, for example, where 
the antagonistic principles of state sovereignty and family love col- 
lide in an ethical dilemma, the subjective (and thus arbitrary) aspect 
of Antigone's defiance of Creon must be expunged by her death in 
order for the objective, ethical principle she represents to be recog- 14




nized and preserved. 
Hegel's gloss on the decisive distinction between comedy and 
tragedy offers a useful key to interpret the metaphorical significance 
it held for the Expressionists and Futurists who tried to envision a 
truly mass democracy. Political life can only provide the masses with 
opportunities to develop subjectivity if political struggle attains the 
heroic quality of myth, Mazzoldi, Hardekopf, and Pfemfert suggest- 
ed. As Hegel's gloss indicates, this stature can only be achieved by 
sacrifice for an ethical principle powerful enough to endow political 
life with a sense of heroic dignity. In other words, common citizens 
need a cause worth fighting and potentially dying for, if they, like 
the princes of previous generations, are to attain political agency. 
What parliamentary politics offered instead, Hardekopf, Pfemfert, 
Anzilotti, and Papini argued, was a trivial form of comedy, which 
acted as an opiate to keep the masses ignorant of their potential as 
political actors. Again, as Hegel's gloss suggests, the comic quality 
of parliamentary theater stems from the unprincipled conduct of 
its actors, their readiness to sacrifice ethical principle for self-pres- 
ervation. The false reconciliation offered by "gladiatorial comedies" 
(Hobsbawm 88) in parliament could not satisfy desires for recogni- 
tion, Expressionists and Futurists observed, because it trivializes the 
ethical conflict that gives political life drama. In contrast to comedy, 
tragedy insists on the irreducibility of social difference and the high 
stakes involved in seeking recognition, which requires risking one's 
life in agonistic struggle. By its very definition, tragedy denies the 
possibility of achieving social reconciliation through rational de- 
bate, which is (or was) the ideal of liberal democracy. 
The introduction of national parliaments in Italy (1861) and 
Germany (1871) represented significant milestones in the triumph 
of liberal ideas in the nineteenth century. A half-century later, the 
comic quality of parliamentary politics in these states testified to 
the stunted (Italy) or stillborn (Germany) lives of their parliamen- 
tary institutions. Both regimes were founded under the rising star 
of liberalism, but neither succeeded in realizing the liberal ideal 
of a parliamentary culture that could translate social conflict into 
political compromise. And yet the introduction of liberal (or, in 
Germany's case, pseudo-liberal) institutions made the extension of 
bourgeois rights to all members of society inevitable. This process 15
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was slowed by remnants of the old order that hindered democra- 
tization through 1914, as Arno Mayer has shown. This deferral of 
democracy was symptomatic for the reactionary climate in which 
Expressionists and Futurists came of age. It would be difficult to 
understand their embrace of a tragic mode of politics without rec- 
ognizing the poisoned atmosphere in which it incubated. For mod- 
ernists of the early twentieth century, the liberal model of limited 
democracy seemed as worn as a Biedermeier sofa. They would not 
have imagined that liberalism might survive the introduction of 
mass suffrage, much less represent the final stage in human history, 
as Fukuyama argued at century's end. 
Liberal Democracy, or Business as Usual 
This analysis of political debates in the most influential forums 
of German Expressionism and Italian Futurism throws new light 
on the political character of cultural modernism before 1914. If re- 
cent research has highlighted the elective affinities of modernism 
for fascism (and vice versa), this analysis of the stage metaphor sug- 
gests that Expressionism and Futurism initially shared a syndicalist- 
tinged commitment to the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty 
that was incompatible with fascist methods of orchestrating popu- 
lar consent for authoritarian rule. By 1918 the extra-parliamentary 
opposition of Futurism and Expressionism had metamorphosed 
into affirmative alliances with revolutionary regimes in the imme- 
diate postwar period. In Germany, where the revolution was initially 
socialist in character, Expressionists produced propaganda for the 
SPD-led government that went on to dissolve revolutionary coun- 
cils and hold parliamentary elections. In Italy, left-wing Futurists 
participated in founding the first fasci in December 1918 and, for a 
while, it was not evident which way Futurism or Fascism would go. 
As things became clearer, left-wing Futurists left a Fascism that was 
becoming more and more reactionary, while more moderate Futur- 
ists were accommodated within Mussolini's regime. As Raymond 
Williams once commented, it would have been difficult to predict in 
1914 where the allegiance of many avant-garde artists and intellec- 
tuals might fall a decade later. "We have to recall that the politics of 
the avant-garde, from the beginning, could go either way," Williams 16





Perry Anderson has argued that the radical spirit of early Ex- 
pressionism and Futurism is best understood as the product of an 
"unstable form of society and an undecided epoch, in which dra- 
matically variable futures were lived as immediately possible" (53). 
Before world war swept away the vestiges of Europe's old order and 
created revolutionary conditions in victorious Italy and defeated 
Germany alike, the outlines of the future remained ambiguous to 
the Expressionists and Futurists who welcomed its coming. "Would 
a new order be more unalloyedly and radically capitalist, or would 
it be socialist?" they asked (Anderson 35). If the future seemed un- 
certain, on one point Expressionists and Futurists were agreed: par- 
liament was a relic of nineteenth-century liberalism destined for 
the dustbin of history. Both groups were convinced that liberalism, 
which had retreated before the prospect of mass democracy at the 
close of the nineteenth century, would not survive the extension of 
political rights in the twentieth. It did not occur to them that liberal 
democracy might fill old skins with new wine without having the 
old skins burst. 
This is what liberal democracy appears to have accomplished 
in the twentieth century, at least according to Fukuyama's account. 
Norberto Bobbio was more skeptical about the success of liberal 
democracy, arguing that the progressive expansion of the franchise 
had put the union of liberalism and democracy on the verge of crisis 
by century's end (1-2). This union was never more than a marriage 
of convenience between contradictory traditions, Chantal Mouffe 
observes. On one hand, the liberal tradition of the Enlightenment, 
which emphasizes rule of law, human rights, and individual liber- 
ty, and, on the other, an older democratic tradition, which stresses 
equality, the identity of governing and governed, and the ideal of 
popular sovereignty. There is no necessary relation between the 
two traditions, Mouffe insists, only an historically contingent ar- 
ticulation. Today this relation is construed in a way that privileges 
individual rights while neglecting the democratic ideal of popular 
sovereignty. She warns that this tendency has created a "democratic 
deficit" and argues that the viability of democratic institutions de- 
pends on the ability to develop an ensemble of practices that can 
create "democratic citizens" (95). This is the problem Expressionists 17
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and Futurists addressed with the metaphor of politics as stage. Nei- 
ther group developed a clear vision of what form mass democracy 
might take, but on one point they were agreed. Their use of the stage 
metaphor insisted that mass political participation depended on a 
qualitative transformation of the democratic ideal of popular sov- 
ereignty and not simply the quantitative extension of voting rights. 
In contrast, the liberal democratic order that triumphed in Fu- 
kuyama's narrative rejected the figure of politics as stage, at least in 
the participatory sense intended by Expressionists and Futurists, for 
something more akin to Weber's model of government as a busi- 
ness. The result is democracy as corporation, in which the individ- 
ual shareholder bears only limited responsibility for the success or 
failure of the collective enterprise. This figure helps to explain the 
reluctance of contemporary political parties to call for personal sac- 
rifices on behalf of the social collective, since it defines each citizen's 
relation to society as that of an individual investor risking private 
capital for personal gain. Fukuyama admitted that this model of 
politics would offer citizens few opportunities to seek recognition. 
As a result, he predicted that the quest for recognition would be 
transposed from politics, which he understands as a metaphorical 
marketplace of ideas, to the literal marketplace of economic compe- 
tition. At the same time, he voiced doubts that economic competi- 
tion would provide an adequate substitute for the agonistic struggle 
unique to political life. This is the "contradiction" liberal democracy 
has yet to resolve, Fukuyama concluded (End of History 314). It is 
the same problem Expressionists and Futurists addressed with the 
metaphor of politics as stage, at a time when mass democracy was 
little more than a futuristic dream. The actuality of this problem 
today suggests a need to re-envision the ideal of mass democracy 
as a horizon of expectation that cannot be reduced to closure in the 
casting of ballots or resolution of policy debates. The alternative, as 
contemporary practices demonstrate, is democracy as business as 
usual, in which the participation of most citizens is limited to that 
of passive consumers. 18
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